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UNDERSTANDING AND TRANSPARENCY 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
Interest in the nature of understanding has swelled among philosophers over 
the last several years, for a few different reasons.   
 
Some have claimed that in order to make sense of science we need an adequate 
theory of understanding, because science aims not just to acquire isolated bits 
of knowledge about the world, but to understand it.  An epistemology of 
science that neglected understanding would therefore be importantly 
incomplete (Elgin 2006; cf. de Regt et. al. 2009).   
 
Moral philosophers have likewise argued that because what we really want in a 
good or flourishing life is not just knowledge but understanding, a proper 
theory of the good life needs to give the achievement of understanding a 
central place (Brewer 2009: ch. 8; Hills 2010: ch. 9). 
 
In this paper I will focus on a related but distinct cluster of reasons why some 
philosophers have directed their attention to understanding, ones that turn 
importantly on questions concerning epistemic value.  On this way of looking 
at things, understanding is not just a higher or more valuable accomplishment 
than knowledge, but it is higher because it involves an element of “reflective 
accessibility” that makes it more suited to the project of first-person 
epistemology, or the project of trying to determine, by one’s own best lights, 
what it is good or proper to believe (see, e.g., Zagzebski 2001; Kvanvig 2003; 
Pritchard 2010). 
 
I take it that lingering in the background here is something like the following 
concern: that as externalist, especially reliabilist, theories of knowledge have 
gained in popularity, knowledge has begun to seem much less impressive than 
traditionally believed.  If it is true that young children and animals can have 
knowledge simply because they can reliably track how things stand in their 
environment, then (it is said) knowledge might be good, but it does not seem 
particularly valuable or laudable.  Perhaps it is good in the way that a well-
operating thermometer is good (one that reliably tracks the ambient 
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temperature), or good in the way that a properly functioning supermarket door 
is good (one that reliably identifies when human beings are nearby).  But if 
this all that it really takes to know then so much the worse for knowledge.  As 
epistemologists, we would do well to focus on other epistemic states, especially 
the state of understanding, which more obviously represents an impressive 
epistemic accomplishment and hence is more evidently worth theorizing 
about.    
 
A related thought is that the really important epistemic states are the ones that 
can be identified “from the inside”—that is, where one can tell, by reflection 
alone, whether one has achieved those states. But since knowledge requires an 
ability to reliably track the world, and since this sort of reliable connection is 
typically not accessible by reflection alone, knowledge has seemed to many to 
be much less relevant to our first-person concerns.  We would therefore do 
well to focus on states such as understanding which seem to be more 
reflectively or internalistically accessible.  Understanding has therefore 
benefited from the growing dissatisfaction with knowledge many have 
experienced.1 
 
In this paper I will swim against this trend and argue that understanding is in 
fact much less transparent or reflectively accessible, and hence much less 
internalist friendly, than many have supposed.  If I am right, although there is 
some sense in which it is fair to say that understanding is transparent in a way 
that ordinary propositional knowledge is not, it is not the sort of transparency 
that is likely to give comfort to internalists.  
 
A further question then becomes: if understanding is not the proper home for 
internalism, where then might it be?  In closing I will consider the possibility 
that the proper home for internalist intuitions is in fact in the state of wisdom, 
rather than understanding.  Perhaps, for internalists, the retreat will therefore 
end there, with wisdom. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 As Duncan Pritchard puts the idea: “Understanding clearly is very amenable to an account along 
epistemically internalist lines, in the sense that it is hard to make sense of how an agent could 
possess understanding and yet lack good reflectively accessible grounds in support of that 
understanding.  Understanding thus cannot be ‘opaque’ to the subject in the way that knowledge, 
by epistemically externalist lights at least, can sometimes be” (p. 105 of 2010 ms).  And Pritchard 
is here explicitly picking up on an earlier thought from Linda Zagzebski: “Understanding has 
internalist conditions for success, whereas knowledge does not…. It may be possible to know 
without knowing that one knows, but it is impossible to understand without understanding that 
one understands.... [U]nderstanding is a state in which I am directly aware of the object of my 
understanding, and conscious transparency is a criterion for understanding.  Those beleaguered by 
skeptical doubts therefore can be more confident of the trustworthiness of putative understanding 
states than virtually any other state” (2001: 246-47). 
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II.  A sketch 
 
In order to assess the extent to which understanding is transparent to 
reflection, it will help to first try to get a better sense of what understanding is.  
In particular, it will help to try to get a better sense of:  
 
(a) understanding’s distinctive object (or objects),  
 
(b) its distinctive psychology, and  
 
(c) the distinctive sort of normative relationship that needs to hold 
between the psychology of the person who understands and the object 
of his or her understanding.   
 
By way of comparison, think of the traditional “justified true belief” analysis of 
knowledge.  On this account, knowledge involves a distinctive object (a true 
proposition), a distinctive psychology (the psychological act of belief or assent), 
and a distinctive normative relationship that needs to hold between the 
psychology of the believer and the thing believed (namely, that the believing of 
the true proposition needs to be justified, in some sense).  What can we say, in 
a parallel way, about the elements of understanding? 
 
III.  The Objects of Understanding 
 
Beginning with the objects of understanding, on the face of they are so varied 
it is not obvious where one might find a common thread.  Thus we can 
understand subject matters (Fred understands quantum mechanics), or 
particular states of affairs (Jada understands why the cup spilled), or 
institutions (the U.S. House of Representatives), or other people (Jada herself), 
and on and on. 
 
On my view, however, the differences among these various objects of 
understanding can be (and has been) overstated,2 and the reason is that in all 
of these cases understanding seems to arise from a grasp of what we might call 
dependency relations.  Although when it comes to more complex structures 
(the House of Representatives, for example) more of these relations are grasped 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 In particular, I believe it is mistake to distinguish, as Kvanvig and Pritchard have done, between 
“objectual understanding” and “understanding-why” (Kvanvig 2003; 2009) or between holistic 
understanding and atomistic understanding (Pritchard 2010).  For both Kvanvig and Pritchard, 
“objectual” or “holistic” understanding has to do with our grasp of large chunks of information, 
especially as they relate to topics or subject matters.  Understanding-why or atomistic 
understanding, by contrast, is focused on some particular state of affairs: understanding why the 
cup spilled, for example, or why Fred did poorly on his exam. 
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than when it comes to understanding particular states of affairs, this does not 
amount to a difference in kind but instead to a difference in degree.3  
 
To illustrate the basic idea, suppose you are sitting in your local coffee shop, 
and you observe the person next to you accidentally nudge her table with her 
knee.  The table then jostles, and her cup spills.  Understanding why the cup 
spilled will require the ability to pick out the nudge as the cause of the spill, 
rather than any of the other potential factors that were in some sense “on the 
scene” or potentially relevant: the time of day, the music that was playing in 
the coffee shop, the color of the cup, and so on.   
 
We can also helpfully represent these different variables according to what 
Alison Gopnik and others have called a “causal map”4 with various nodes, as 
follows:  
 
T 
 K   
S 
 C 
M 
In this case the time of day (T) is represented by a variable that can take on 
many possible values, and likewise for the ambient music (M) and the color of 
the cup (C).  The position of the knee (K) relative to the table, by contrast, 
might be a variable with just two discrete values, nudging or not nudging, and 
similarly for the contents of the cup, as spilled or not spilled (S).5   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 On my view the appeal to dependence relations is also the best way to try to illuminate the 
widespread idea that understanding involves a grasp of structure or pattern of some kind (see, e.g., 
Moravscik 1979, Zagzebski 2001, and Riggs 2003). 
4 To keep the terminology consistent, we could change Gopnik’s phrase “causal map” to 
“dependency map,” but I stick with Gopnik’s terminology because it is her idea.  I prefer the 
notion of dependence because, following Jaegwon Kim (1994), I think it includes the notion of 
causal dependence but more besides (e.g., mereological dependence).  For more on this idea see 
Grimm (2006; 2014). 
5 We could also seek a more fine-grained explanation—not just spill or not spill, but how much, 
etc.  In that case we could represent a variable that could take on a spectrum of values.  (And the 
same could hold, of course, for the “K” variable—we could represent nudges of varying force, for 
example.) 
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In this case, moreover, the arrow represents a genuine relation of dependence 
while the (arrow-less) lines connecting time and music fail to identify a real 
dependence and are thus “empty” or non-causal.  The person who understands 
why the cup spilled will therefore be able (at a minimum) to pick out the 
nudging as the cause of the spill from among all of the other possible factors.6 
 
Suppose however that we are concerned not with understanding some 
particular state of affairs, but rather a larger subject matter.  Still, in this case 
what is required for understanding seems again to be the ability to represent 
how the various elements of that system depend on one another, a type of 
representation that can again be depicted via a causal map.  Thus to 
understand a subject such as the House of Representatives, for example, might 
be to accept or cognitively host a map along the following lines (simplifying 
significantly): 
 
Q     
 
P  S  X  Z 
 
R    Y  
What someone therefore represents in this case is how the various elements of 
the House depend upon one another: what it takes for bills to be proposed, or 
for amendments to be introduced, or for them to become laws; who is entitled 
to speak, at which times; how committees are formed, and how leadership is 
determined; and so on. 
 
As all of this suggests, a map that in fact accurately portrays all of the different 
dependency relations in the House of Representative would be enormously 
complicated, much more complicated than represented above.7  For our 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Of course there are other dependencies lurking in the background here: the nudge would not 
have led to the spill had the cup been crazy-glued to the table, for example.  So does the spill 
depend on the presence or absence of crazy glue, and should we insert a node portraying this 
relationship on our map? My inclination is to say no: context will plausibly often/typically 
determine which factors are mere “background” conditions and which are causally relevant. 
7 It also gives rise to a number of interesting questions: For instance, how many of these various 
relationships does one need to accurately represent in order to understand the subject in question?  
Is it possible to misrepresent (or have false beliefs about) certain aspects of the system and yet still 
count as understanding it?  And is it more important to accurately represent certain aspects of the 
subject—what we might call the core aspects—than others? Although I will not defend the point 
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purposes however the important thing to see is that the differences between 
the causal maps pertaining to our understanding of states of affairs on the one 
hand and subject matters on the other do not seem to be as significant as the 
similarities.  They are different, in the sense that (a) more relations are 
represented in the subject matter map, and (b) when it comes to states of 
affairs, there is a focus on understanding one of the nodes, rather than the 
system as a whole.  But this seems considerably less significant than that in 
both cases the key to understanding lies in accurately representing dependency 
relations.   
 
IV.  The Psychology of Understanding 
 
To this point I have been focusing on the “object of understanding”—i.e., 
what is understood.  And I have been arguing that the object of understanding 
is dependency relations, which we can mentally represent by means of causal 
maps.  But now the key question is: how should we think about the 
psychological uptake of these maps, exactly?  In other words, is it enough for 
the mind to represent these relations in, as it were, a static way, where 
someone might simply assent to the accuracy of the maps, perhaps by 
deferring to the authority of an expert? 
 
I believe the answer to this question is no, and that someone who merely 
assented to the accuracy of a map like this would not thereby understand the 
target system.  I have defended this claim at some length elsewhere (Grimm 
2010, 2014), but here I will make a case for it by different means, by calling 
attention to one of the most striking features of the causal maps as described 
by Gopnik et al: namely, that they are, as it were, “mobile” maps.  That is, they 
are maps that by their very nature can adapt and change as the variables 
represented on the map take on different values.  Or perhaps better, they are 
“unsaturated” maps, in the sense that they are characterized in terms of 
unsaturated variables that can become saturated by taking on different values.   
 
What this means in terms of cognitive uptake is important, because if the 
maps are mobile or unsaturated in this way, then the mind that takes them up 
in a way that yields understanding must itself be mobile or capable of 
saturation.  More exactly, what that means is that in order for a mind to take 
up a causal map in a way that yields understanding it must be able to anticipate 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
here, my own guess is that many of the answer to many of these questions will appeal to 
contextualist elements.  Thus relative to certain contexts—a cocktail party, say—a person who 
accurately represents 40% of the structure will count as understanding it, while in other contexts—
an exam situation—we will have doubts about whether the person “really” understands it.  I would 
also not be surprised if pragmatic factors played a role here.  For work on all of these questions, see 
Kvanvig 2003, Riggs (2009), and Carter and Gordon (2014). 
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how varying or adjusting the value of one of the variables will lead (or fail to 
lead) to changes in the values of the other variables.8   
 
The maps are therefore not static maps, and the mind that genuinely absorbs 
them in a way that yields understanding will not be a static mind.  This is the 
phenomenon that I have elsewhere described in terms of “grasping” 
dependencies or grasping causal structure, or of being able to “see” or 
anticipate how varying the value of one of the variables will lead (or fail to 
lead) to a change in the value of another variable.  What this grasp involves is 
thus an ability to make modal inferences or to “see” into modal space.  More 
prosaically, it is the ability to identify how changes in one part of the system or 
structure will lead (or fail to lead) to changes in other parts. 
 
V.  The Normativity of Understanding  
 
Suppose we grant for the moment that two central elements of understanding 
have now been identified: the object of understanding, characterized in terms 
of dependency relations, and the cognitive or psychological element of 
understanding, characterized in terms of appropriately taking up the causal 
maps that accurately represent how things stand in the world.  Is that all there 
is?  According to Jonathan Kvanvig’s influential 2003 work on understanding, 
the answer is: very nearly so.  Beyond satisfying the accuracy condition, 
Kvanvig then argued, what understanding centrally requires is an internal 
grasp of how the various elements of a topic or subject matter are related:  
 
What is distinctive about understanding has to do with the way in 
which an individual combines pieces of information into a unified 
body.  This point is not meant to imply that truth is not important for 
understanding, for we have noted already the factive character of both 
knowledge and understanding.  But once we move past its facticity, the 
grasping of relations between items of information is central to the 
nature of understanding.  By contrast, when we move past the facticity 
of knowledge, the central features involve non-accidental connections 
between mind and world.  (Kvanvig 2003: 197)   
 
The final ingredient in Kvanvig’s 2003 puzzle is an element of subjective 
justification: one cannot understand some target system if by one’s own lights 
there is something awry about one’s epistemic position. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 James Woodward (2003) has helpfully characterized this in terms of the ability to answer “What 
if things had been different?” questions. 
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The key point for 2003 Kvanvig, however, is that so long as the accuracy, 
grasping, and subjective justification conditions are satisfied, how one came by 
one’s accurate grasp is irrelevant to the achievement of understanding.  
Suppose that one reads a history book full of inaccurate facts but one’s dyslexia 
miraculously transforms them all into truths.  According to Kvanvig, one could 
then come to an understanding of a subject matter thereby.9  Or suppose that 
someone intent on deceiving you fabricates a story about how a particular 
disease progresses through the body, a story that happens by a complete fluke 
to be accurate.  According to Kvanvig, one can then come to understand how 
the disease progresses, even though the accuracy of one’s grasp is based on 
sheer luck or accident. 
 
Others, however, have balked at this claim, and apparently with good reason.  
As Pritchard notes, it is deeply implausible to think you can come to 
understand the world through lucky guesses or through being the victim of 
massive deception (2010).   To add cases: suppose you are duped into thinking 
that reading animal entrails is a reliable way of learning about the world, and 
are thereby subjectively justified in accepting their results.  On Kvanvig’s view, 
on the one-in-a-million chance that the entrails accurately explain something 
about the world (e.g., pick out a real causal relationship in the world), you 
could thereby understand that thing.10  And similarly for trusting Ouija 
boards, tea leaves, and so on.11  Since it is hard to believe that these sorts of 
methods can lead to genuine understanding of the world, what seems needed 
in addition to an accurate, subjectively justified grasp of the world is some sort 
of reliable connection between one’s grasp and how the world is.  Or, as 
Pritchard claims, one needs to acquire one’s accurate grasp “in the right 
fashion” (2010: 108) or “in the right kind of way” (2010: 110)—in others 
words, by means of a reliable source of method.12 
 
VI.  How Internalist? 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Kvanvig offers this example in his (2009) and (2015).  He seems to offer it as a more streamlined 
version of his Comanche case from (2003: 198-99). 
10 Or, if you want to keep the topic appropriately “objectual,” imagine that the entrails revealed 
something about a subject matter rather than a state of affairs.  As argued above, I do not find this 
distinction helpful, but the example could be easily modified. 
11 So long, again, as one was subjectively justified in accepting those deliverances.  But it is easy 
enough to come up with a case where someone is simply duped into believing these sources are 
reliable. 
12 I have been referring to Kvanvig (2003) throughout because in Kvanvig (2009a) he claims that 
the conditions he earlier articulated might not be sufficient, and that he may need to make a 
“minor revision” to his theory by adding a reliability condition (2009a: 105).  In my view this 
would not amount to a minor revision because it would mean that understanding would become a 
deeply externalist state. 
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Suppose that the distinctive objects, psychology, and normative properties of 
understanding are roughly as described.  We can now ask: in what sense is 
understanding thus an “essentially internalist” notion, or the proper home for 
internalist ideas?  For instance, with respect to which of these elements of 
understanding—possessing an accurate causal picture of the world, grasping 
how it works, and having a reliable connection between one’s map and the 
world—can one tell by reflection alone that they are possessed?  
 
With respect to the accuracy condition—that one can only understand the 
world if one grasps its actual structure or relations—it should be clear that one 
cannot tell from the inside, or by reflection alone, whether one has gotten the 
world right.  For instance, one cannot tell from the inside whether one’s house 
has burned down from faulty wiring or from some other cause; or again, one 
cannot tell from the inside whether one has suffered a “causal illusion” of the 
sort illustrated by Simpson’s paradox (see Gopnik et. al. 2004: 13).  What 
about the reliability condition?  Here too I take it that it is hard to see how 
this could be transparent to reflection.  Perhaps I can tell, on the basis of a 
given set of evidence or data and in light of my a priori knowledge of Bayes’s 
theorem, that certain variables are more likely to be causally relevant than 
others.  But I can hardly tell by reflection alone that the data is representative 
or accurate and so on.  In other words, perhaps what I can tell from the inside 
is that a particular causal inference might be conditionally reliable—reliable 
given the representativeness and accuracy of my data.  But I cannot tell from 
the inside that my causal inference is actually reliable.  And since the actual 
reliability of an inference seems to be needed for understanding, this important 
element too will be opaque to reflection. 
 
VII.  Articulacy 
 
The prospects for the full transparency of understanding do not therefore 
appear promising, and it is hard to see how it could even be something like a 
“mainly” or “primarily” internalist notion, given the importance of the accuracy 
and reliability conditions.  Nonetheless, the fact that a wide range of respected 
epistemologists—including Zagzebski, Kvanvig, and Pritchard—have taken 
there to be an important internalist dimension to understanding suggests that 
we should look harder to try to get at the source of this idea.   
 
 
Consider for instance the following passage from Pritchard, a variant of his 
earlier quote above: 
 
[U]nderstanding seems to be essentially an epistemically internalist 
notion, in the sense that if one has understanding then it should not be 
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opaque to one that that one has this understanding—in particular, one 
should have good reflectively accessible grounds in support of the 
relevant beliefs that undergird that understanding. (p. 112 of 2010 ms) 
 
For Pritchard, then, even though understanding is not a “purely” internalist 
notion because of the accuracy requirement and its susceptibility to certain 
kinds of luck, it is still an “essentially” internalist notion.   
 
Why?  As suggested above, I take it that what Pritchard is impressed by in 
contrasting knowledge with understanding is the fact that sometimes one can 
genuinely know something and yet be unable to offer any grounds in support 
of one’s knowledge.  A chicken sexer, for example, might genuinely know a 
certain chick is male (because of his reliable ability to discriminate males from 
females) yet be unable to offer any grounds in support of his belief.  He might 
just shrug his shoulders when asked “Why do you think that?”  And of course 
if one thinks animals can know—that your dog can know you are about to go 
for a walk, or that the squirrel just ran up a tree—then there are many, many 
cases of knowledge where “reflectively accessible grounds” are lacking, simply 
because the knower lacks the meta-cognitive ability to reflect on, or to 
articulate, his or her grounds. 
 
On Pritchard’s view, however, understanding is not like that.  And while he 
does not spell out why exactly he thinks that understanding is importantly 
transparent (non-opaque), it is not hard to imagine what is driving him.  For 
instance, when I understand why the cup spilled, it is not a mystery to me—
not opaque to me—why the cup spilled.  I can point to the nudge as the cause 
of the spill.  Or again, when I understand how the House of Representatives 
works I will presumably be able to answer a number of different questions 
about it works.  Put in terms familiar from Aristotle, the guiding thought 
seems to be that someone who understands does not simply know that such-
and-such is the case but knows “the why” of that thing.  If she understands 
why p, for instance,  she can always say something on behalf of p, or point to 
grounds for her understanding, in a way the chicken sexer cannot. 
 
Of course the grounds here are quite distinctive.  They are grounds in the 
sense of being answers to “Why?” questions, or perhaps “What if things had 
been different?” questions.  They are not grounds that will enable one to ward 
off a critic who might ask: “How do you know you’re not suffering from a 
causal illusion?  Or that your data was really representative?  Etc.”  
Understanding is therefore not transparent in the sense that it would allow one 
to ward off radical sceptical attack.  But perhaps it is transparent in the sense 
that one seems to be able to “see” the correct answer to “Why?” or “What if 
things had been different?” questions.  It would therefore count, as Pritchard 
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suggests, as partially or essentially transparent, even if it is not fully 
transparent. 
 
Let us think of this, for the time being, as an articulacy requirement on 
understanding: namely, that when one understands one can offer some 
grounds on behalf of one’s understanding—not necessarily grounds that would 
ward off sceptical doubts, but grounds in the sense of answers to why 
questions.   
 
VIII.  Young children, animals, and understanding  
 
Although one can appreciate the intuitive pull of this idea, ultimately I believe 
it is not the case that articulacy is a necessary condition on understanding, or 
that one needs to have reflectively accessible grounds in support of one’s 
understanding.  And the main reason to reject this claim when it comes to 
understanding is closely tied to—perhaps just identical to—the main reason 
many have rejected this idea when it comes to knowledge: namely, that 
understanding (like knowledge) seems to be available to animals and young 
children, even though animals and young children apparently lack the meta-
cognitive ability to identify the grounds of their understanding.  If this is right, 
the very same sorts of cases involving animals and young children that led 
epistemologists to think that knowledge could sometimes be unreflective or 
opaque or inarticulate also seem to show the same thing about understanding.   
 
Let me try to illustrate this with the case of young children first, appealing to 
recent work by psychologists studying infant cognition.  Thus studies 
conducted by Susan Carey and her colleagues seem to show that infants 
between the age of 7 to 10 months are able to make accurate inferences about 
causal relationships.  For instance, when infants observe a bean bag being 
tossed from behind a screen, they act surprised if the screen is subsequently 
removed to find no one there (Carey 2009: 234-40; Saxe, Tzelnic, & Carey, 
2007; Saxe, Tenebaum, and Carey 2005).  More exactly, they look noticeably 
longer in cases where the screen is removed and no one is present than when 
the screen is removed and someone is there.  The children therefore seem to 
have inferred a dependence between the appearance of the bean bag and 
human agency, and formed a causal map to this effect.13  When this map is 
undercut in the (wholly artificial, contrived) case when no one is behind the 
screen, the children pause to try to make sense of this disparate piece of 
evidence about how the world works, or how its various elements depend upon 
one another.  Or, put another way, in answer to the implicit question: “Why is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Another possibility is that causal understanding along these lines is hardwired.  I take it this will 
not affect the basic point that pre-articulate children have causal understanding. 
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the bag moving through the air?” the children seem to have instinctively 
inferred because someone is throwing it.  They also seem to have inferred if there 
is no one to throw the bag, it should not move like that.  And this even though in 
both cases they were not at a level where they could articulate these thoughts. 
 
Similarly, in a series of studies Alison Gopnik has shown that children as 
young as 2 or 3 are adept at identifying the “real” cause of a situation (Gopnik 
2000, 2004, 2012).  For example, when experimenters in Gopnik’s lab 
introduced children to a “Blicket machine,” and told them that by placing 
some blocks but not others on the machine they could make the machine “go” 
(in this case, play music), the children were able to reliably identify the sorts of 
blocks that were capable of activating the machine.  Through observation and 
occasional hands-on manipulation, they were able to determine, for instance, 
whether it was the shape of the block or instead its color or its size that was 
responsible for making the machine go. 
 
Psychological studies aside, I take it the basic idea will seem familiar from 
common experience.  Imagine an 11-month-old toddler who sees a toy on top 
of a stand.  The toddler pushes the stand, and the toy drops to the floor: the 
desired result.  The toddler will then not be at a loss, most likely, the next time 
she encounters a toy on the top of the stand.  She will not suppose that it was 
the ambient music that caused the toy to fall, or the time of day, or the fact 
that another playmate was nearby, looking at the stand.  She will suppose that 
it was her pushing that led—that caused—the toy to fall, and she will thereby 
have formed an accurate causal map to the effect that pushing things of this 
sort characteristically leads to toppling or falling.  No doubt many of the causal 
inferences she makes will not be as straightforward as this, and some will be 
mistaken.  But the accurate ones will often be reinforced through repetition 
and gain more stability over time. 
 
Now, if this is a correct picture of how children come to understand the world, 
it would not be at all surprising if non-human animals possessed a similar 
ability.  After all, they, like us, are actors in the world, and actors in the world 
are at an advantage when they can identify how the various elements of the 
world depend on one another, and hence how certain elements can be 
manipulated to bring about certain (desirable) effects.  Recent studies on rats 
and crows, moreover, have indicated precisely such an ability to identify causal 
relationships. 
 
According to Blaisdell et. al. (2006), for example, rats are able to correctly 
differentiate between common-cause models of influence, causal chains, and 
direct causal links.  Put another way, they are able to distinguish between cases 
involving mere covariation between variables (as in a common-cause model) 
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and cases where the covariation is evidence of a causal relationship.  Similarly, 
New Caledonian crows appear able to infer causal relationships in ways that go 
beyond mere conditioning (Taylor et. al. 2009; Taylor et. al. 2012).  For 
instance, in a series of experiments the crows were able to discriminate cases 
where human beings were responsible for moving a stick from cases where a 
stick was being moved by an unknown source.  Just as in Susan Carey’s 
experiments with the infants and the bean bags, the crows seem to have 
accurately inferred (in the first case) that agents were responsible for the 
movement of the stick, and when the agents were absent but the (contrived) 
movement still occurred, their causal map was called into question, leading to 
more cautious and wary behavior. 
 
All in all, there is thus good reason to think that children and animals have the 
ability to form accurate causal maps about the world—to accurately represent 
how various elements of the world depend upon others—even though they 
might lack reflective access to these representations, perhaps simply because 
they lack the meta-cognitive ability to reflect at all, and hence even though 
they cannot articulate how these dependencies work.  Reflectively accessible 
grounds do not therefore appear to be essential for understanding in the way 
Pritchard and others have suggested. 
 
IX.  Some concerns 
 
How might an advocate of an essentially internalist conception of 
understanding respond to these sorts of cases?  Perhaps most obviously, some 
might say that as alluring as the examples involving animals and young 
children might seem, there is no real understanding present in these cases.  
This is for a few different reasons.  For example, some might argue that real 
understanding requires the ability to identify causal mechanisms, or the causal 
processes actually responsible for bringing about events, and that inferences 
based on things like manipulation or observed covariation are not enough.14  
Alternatively, it might be thought that genuine understanding requires the 
ability to subsume events under laws, and that the ability to formulate laws is 
beyond children and animals.  We can address both these concerns in turn. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Wesley Salmon defends this view in his Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the 
World: “[C]ausal processes, causal interactions, and causal laws provide the mechanisms by which 
the world works; to understand why certain things happen, we need to see how they are produced 
by these mechanisms” (1984: 132); “To understand the world and what goes in on it, we must 
expose its inner workings. To the extent that causal mechanisms operate, they explain how the 
world works” (1984: 133). 
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To the point that understanding requires the identification of causal 
mechanisms, my reply is that this is too demanding.  Suppose I am chopping 
carrots and onions in the kitchen while preparing a meal, and in the midst of 
the chopping my eyes start to water.  Given my past experience, I can now 
surely understand why my eyes are watering—because I am chopping onions—
even though I might not have a clue about the particulars of onion and eyeball 
chemistry that underlie the watering (cf. Grimm 2014).  I do not think, for 
example, that it was the carrots or the time of day or the color of my shirt that 
was the cause of the watering.  It was the onions.  And it is the ability to pick 
out or grasp the cause in this way that presumably yields understanding, even 
absent knowledge of the underlying mechanism.  Or again, suppose I am 
wondering why the TV just sprang to life, and then I notice that my daughter 
just entered the room with the remote control in her hand, pointed at the TV.  
I can now presumably understand why TV just sprang to life—because she just 
pressed the “On” button on the remote control—even though I might be 
unable to tell any story about the physical mechanisms (radio waves etc.) 
linking remote control to set.  This is not to deny that the ability to identity 
mechanisms might be relevant to understanding (it might, for example, be 
relevant to having a deeper understanding of the world).  It is simply to deny 
that the ability to identify mechanisms is required for much of the 
understanding we seem to enjoy throughout the day. 
 
Another worry might be that understanding requires an appeal to laws in a 
way that exceeds the power of children or animals.  Thomas Hurka describes 
this concern as follows: 
 
You understand a truth when you can place it in a larger context and 
connect it to more fundamental principles that explain why it holds.  
That connection and the understanding it leads to are precisely what 
generality in the explanatory sense finds good, and the idea that they’re 
good is again intuitive.  To match your mind to the world you have to 
match not only the separate facts it contains but also the explanatory 
relations between them.  If you know only what’s true but not why, you 
don’t know everything there is to know because you don’t know what 
accounts for what.  And the capacity to know this again distinguishes 
us from other animals.  Maybe a dog can know that a ball is falling, but 
it can’t understand why it’s falling by connecting that fact to more 
abstract truths about why bodies in general fall.  (Hurka 2011: 82-83)  
According to Hurka, understanding thus requires an appeal to “abstract truths” 
or “more fundamental principles”—by which, I take it, Hurka seems to mean 
something like general laws—and animals lack the ability to make such an 
appeal.  Although he does not mention them, I would not be surprised if he 
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thinks young children too lack this ability, at least at their level of 
development. 
 
My reply in this case is not (as before) that an appeal to laws or law-like 
generalizations is too demanding, but rather that the reason why laws and 
generalizations provide understanding is that they encode information about 
dependencies, the grasp of which we have taken to be crucial to  
understanding.  Thus Newton’s Second Law, f=ma, encodes information about 
how the variables force, mass, and acceleration depend upon one another; for 
instance, the law depicts how changing the value of a variable such as 
acceleration will lead to a change in the value or amount of force (ceteris 
paribus).  Even though young children and animals might not be able to grasp 
these relationships at a high level of abstraction, the results above suggest that 
they can appeal to generalizations that are relatively invariant or stable across 
contexts, and can subsume particular events under these generalizations (for 
more on invariance see Woodward 2003: ch. 6).  If we are willing to think of 
these generalizations as laws, or at least as proto-laws or as law-like, then it 
seems that young children and animals will be capable of understanding even 
by Hurka’s standards. 
 
A final way one might try to preserve the idea that understanding requires 
articulacy would be by trying to distinguish different kinds or varieties of 
understanding, and saying that articulacy goes along with the higher or more 
reflective brands of understanding.  Thus (in line with Ernest Sosa’s 
distinction between animal and reflective knowledge) one might say that while 
there is something like animal understanding, which simply requires an ability 
to grasp or identify dependencies, there is also reflective understanding, or 
perhaps mature or properly adult understanding, where one can also articulate 
the reason why.   
 
While I do not want to deny that one could make a distinction along these 
lines, I would only point out that it would now not be understanding per se 
that would be deserving of newfound attention, but rather a particular brand of 
understanding: reflective understanding, or understanding where one can 
articulate the why.  This sort of articulacy would also not be the exclusive 
possession of understanding.  As noted, the sort of reflective knowledge 
described by Sosa would be another place where articulacy about grounds 
could be found.  So perhaps what is really of interest to epistemologists trying 
to capture internalist intuitions are first-person reasons (involving articulacy 
about grounds) wherever they might be found, not necessarily the states of 
knowledge or understanding per se—a point worth bearing in mind as we 
develop our accounts of these states. 
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X.  Conclusion 
 
I want to close by making three suggestions.  First, that there is a way of 
thinking about even the sort of low-level, animal understanding I have 
described in this paper so that it contains an interesting and important element 
of transparency—perhaps not the sort that advocates of the articulacy 
condition would like, but transparency nonetheless.  Second, that appreciating 
the way in which understanding is transparent helps to shed light on the 
distinctive value of understanding.  And finally, that perhaps the true home for 
internalist intuitions is not in the state of understanding but instead in 
wisdom.  
 
Consider first that what it means for something to be transparent is that it can 
be “seen through.”  With this in mind, my suggestion is that if there is a sort 
of transparency that is essential to all types of understanding it involves the 
ability to “see through” the here and now and into how things stand in modal 
space, or in counterfactual situations.  For notice that when I grasp that the 
spill was caused by the nudging, then if I consider whether the spill would 
have occurred in the absence of the nudge (ceteris paribus), then I can in some 
sense “see” that the answer is no.  But this sort of seeing or transparency 
arguably requires no meta-cognitive abilities.  It is the sort of seeing that seems 
to be available to any creatures with the ability to reason counterfactually, 
young children and animals included.    
 
Regarding the second point, thinking of transparency along these lines also 
helps to reveal why understanding is especially valuable—why it is a 
particularly prized epistemic good.  For notice that on this way of thinking 
about transparency, someone who understands will be in a remarkable position 
not just to predict how the world will unfold, but possibly to control how it 
will unfold.  Since the person who understands grasps how various elements of 
the world depend upon one another, he or she will know for instance that in 
order to bring about state of affairs r rather than s, a change needs to be made 
to y.  It is arguably this great power that would therefore help to explain why, 
as Pritchard puts it, “we would surely rather understand than merely know” 
(2010: 74), or as Aristotle and Aquinas claim, that human beings are not 
satisfied until they have found the why.  On the view defended here, what 
explains this preference for understanding is not that understanding brings 
with it articulacy, or the ability to respond to the sceptic, or internalist prizes 
along those lines.  Instead, the special value of understanding derives from our 
natural interest in predicting and possibly controlling how the world will 
unfold.  At least, I want to argue, that goes a long way towards explaining the 
sorts of intuitions in favor of understanding offered by Pritchard, Aristotle, 
and others, even if we should grant that it does not exhaust them. 
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Finally, I want to close by suggesting that perhaps the proper home of the 
articulacy condition is not knowledge or understanding but instead wisdom, 
arguably the greatest of epistemic goods.  Why?  For two main reasons.  First, 
because it seems to be one of the hallmarks of wisdom that the wise person is a 
source of advice, someone to whom we can turn when we need assistance.  
The inarticulate wise person therefore seems like a contradiction in terms.   
 
Second, it seems that wisdom is essentially meta-cognitive in a way that is not 
the case with knowledge or understanding.  Suppose that the wise person is 
someone who knows the best way to act in a certain situation, and suppose 
that the best way to act is course B.  If someone simply chooses B by instinct 
or by chance, then it does not seem that the person demonstrates wisdom in 
choosing B.  Instead, for the course of action to count as wise it seems like the 
person needs to be able to identify course B as best—that is, he or she needs to 
be able to recognize what it is about B that makes it superior to alternatives A 
or C.  Wisdom therefore seems to require a sort of perspective or reflective 
distance from one’s beliefs that we do not necessarily find with knowledge or 
understanding.  It is therefore arguably the proper home for internalist 
intuitions that were first sought in knowledge, and then later in 
understanding.   
 
That said, since finding a proper home for internalist intuitions has proven 
difficult before, we should be alive to the possibility that when we look more 
closely at wisdom too we will find cases where the internalist element is 
lacking.  That, at least, seems to have been the track record so far. 
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